These are the most expensive classes. The fact that there is no such a market, where these graduates could do their jobs. Karolina Wigura: If we were to create jobs for every single graduate of these two universities, how many places would it be? Is this possible at all using public funds? Piotr Szumlewicz: Many Poles would like to work in the public sector, and a vast majority wants a stable job.
Telling people that stability is not important and that they want to change jobs frequently is an ideology without any empirical support. But I cannot agree that the only acceptable solution to that is a job in the public sector. Actions taken by the young people suggest that if they see an opportunity for a professional development, they follow that chance, they are willing to change the job, they accept a flexible labour market.
The state cannot guarantee a job for everyone, but must give some opportunities for a professional take off. We need more thinking of this kind at universities. We have to get used to the idea, that the economy is changing so fast, that we will have to change and develop our qualifications at least few times. And chances for a stable professional position are a function of your position at the labour market, measured by your qualifications and your relations with the employers. I agree that stability is important, that the Polish labour market must offer more jobs of a better quality, and I truly hope, that we are in the phase, when these good changes start to happen.
There must be much more job offers of the best quality, but nonetheless, professional training of the graduates will be crucial in their chances for a job and good work conditions. Joanna Tyrowicz: Katarzyna Kasia pointed to a very interesting thing. She said that there is no place for artists on the labour market. But there is a similar situation with traders, since the Polish financial sector is not sophisticated enough.
We need analysts that will work clearly and effectively, and not someone who can model an algorithm of automatic finances. Nonetheless, traders are still being trained. Furthermore, how many quantum physicists do we need in Poland? The situation of the well-trained artists is not something very exceptional. I do not think that from the argument that there is no market for a specific sector in Poland, we should conclude that the state should create jobs for them.
We must stop thinking about education as something automatic: I have graduate with this and that degree, so I should pursue such and such career. In the central system of job offers, there are about 70, offers. And how many in private online services providing similar services?
Few times more! A usual Polish worker changes jobs every 2,5 year. If we take into account people under 30 only- every months. Young Poles look for different alternatives, not only in financial terms, but they also look for better places to live, for opportunities to realize their personal passions, plans, aspirations.
I want to stress again that Poles change their jobs more often than people from other European countries. This is not a result of fixed-time contracts- they change jobs whether they have a full-time employment or not. Age does not matter here as well. Therefore, a fixed-time contract is not an issue. We do not have any research, which would explain the barriers for their development, from their side, and from the side of employers.
GUS and OECD say completely different things about inequalities in Poland, perhaps it means we should take into account more factors than the finances? I think that we should treat young people in the same way as we treat other employees. I am not convinced by the suggestion that the youth can work on worse conditions, do nonpaid internships, be exploited because of their age. And the third thing- public institutions. Most of the research agree on a fictional model that we have some specific education system: that people are educated, and then join something called a free market, where they can freely choose a job.
Some wants to be sculptors, but if there is no demand for that, it means they chose a wrong degree. In the whole EU, including Poland, the labour market is to a great extent regulated by the state. In short, the state decides to a great extent which sector will have more jobs. A usual young Polish worker changes jobs every months. They look for different alternatives, not only in financial terms, but they also look for better places to live, for opportunities to realize their personal passions, plans, aspirations. From what you were saying, it seems that Poles like to change jobs.
Surely, some people change jobs because they look for a better path for themselves. Some people- because they cannot support their families for the wages they get. Businessmen compete not only with by their products, but also by reducing their costs. If one baker hires people on very bad conditions, the other will do exactly the same very soon- in order to reduce costs. And one more reference to Katarzyna Kasia. The state is also a player on the labour market. It hires policemen, soldiers, teachers. There is no single force in Poland that would fight against too high taxes for small businesses and workers, and too low taxes for corporations on the other hand.
CIT, paid by big corporations, is particularly important here. And a micro-businessman must pay 1, PLN a month, no matter what his income is. Voice II: Some of the panellists seem to forget that apart from the university students, many people end their education at the vocational schools level. Employers do not engage in these schools at all. I am terrified by the Polish version of neoliberalism: mobbing, rat race, never-ending competition, lack of cooperation. Perhaps Polish companies would need more sociologists and psychologists. But which corporation would want to hire them?
They look for cogs, not for people that think independently. Karolina Wigura: Before I hand over to the panellists, I would like to add few more things, using my position as the moderator of this discussion. First of all, no one can make private companies to hire psychologists.
But I have a sense- and I have worked in Polish corporations for six years- that Polish companies lack not necessarily psychologists, but rather good bosses. Unfortunately, as a society we must be patient. Second of all, I am convinced, that if it is so unpleasant in big corporations, then perhaps at least part of our generation has no other option than starting their own companies and organizations, where we could provide convenient work conditions for ourselves and for others.
Third of all, I am a boss myself, and I will say few words about the Polish competences of cooperation. Young people often come to us without any cooperation skills. We have to teach them everything from the beginning. But here again, I suggest we should be patient. Now I would like to ask the panellists for some conclusions.
They are also the target group of the European programmes.
So the system supports them in a way. Entrepreneurs also have many reliefs, exemptions and extra payments. They prefer to work in the public sector, or in big private companies. It is worth to remember that non-insurance contracts virtually do not exist in most of the developed countries, even in those considered to be liberal, like Switzerland. Katarzyna Kasia: At the Academy of Fine Arts we try to work on interaction between the employers and the academic world, so that our graduates have better chances to get a job.
Concerning the question whether the state should finance the artists, I am not so sure about that. And in the case of the self-employed, they are even regressive- the more you earn, the less are your fiscal obligations. Concerning the issue of the influence of public spendings on the creation of new jobs, all research I have done myself shows, that there is no correlation like that. Creating jobs by the public sector is not so easy. And now the most important thing: we say a lot about strategic thinking, long-term planning. Wages for instance. Basically, employer in Poland does not have any tools to lower wages- it requires a special changing notice, and if the worker does not accept it, huge compensations might follow.
What is the effect of such regulations? In this way employers are manipulating the ban on lowering salaries. Focusing on the bonus, employees accept such terms, since no one has thought about the crisis. Next time, when we will try to regulate something, we should about the real- and not only the postulated- results of such actions. Auf der anderen Seite hingegen sollten die Ereignisse in der Ukraine und die Wahlen am Just a few days ago, standing in the richly decorated St George Hall in the Kremlin, talking about the successful annexation of Crimea, Vladimir Putin sounded like a victor, one in a long line of such figures in the annals of Russian imperial politics.
And yet, the groundbreaking aspect of his speech was hidden elsewhere. Some might disagree with this statement. Perhaps then fear of a repeat of history is more alive now than at any other time in the past few decades? Nothing could be further from the truth. European narrations of remembrance have become nothing more than a picture puzzle, made up of ever more meaningless rhetoric — its pieces assembled and reassembled at random.
In a piece written for Liberal Culture , Lech M. Nijakowski turns our attention to the problems inherent in a politic of reconciliation. There is much wisdom in this claim, and yet without reconciliation, post-WWII European politics cannot be said to exist. Post-WWII politics of reconciliation, initiated originally around a Germany trying to account for its Nazi crimes, contributed substantially to the development of a narrative which then dominated Europe over the coming decades.
It was a narrative of criticism of its own past, of caution around any sort of ideological blindness, of deep reflection regarding how it conducted its own governance. The fact that reconciliation was also a form of strategy — its spectacular declarations became, after all, something of an expected add-on to diplomatic developments intended to improve mutual relations — does not have to mean that it was only a way of expressing political cynicism and lack of respect to the feelings of the victims.
And yet, at the same time as experts at conferences were conducting heated debates about memory, while grant giving institutions signed off tens of thousands of Euros for such gatherings, in the political and social spheres grand changes were taking place. As memory of two totalitarian states, previously functioning as the basis for all critical thinking about the past, faded, new narrations began to colonise the space previously occupied by a unified European ideology.
The catalyst for this change was partly a simple swapping of generations, and partly the financial crisis and a wider weakening of political leadership. And hence European political correctness, related to memory, began to mean something very different to what it had meant previously. Vladimir Putin, unleashing a propaganda machine with which to transform the culture of remembrance, suddenly became a man of his time.
One of them happened to prick the other with the securing pin. How inappropriate this joke sounds became clear soon enough. Not only that, but it also became clear just how much Europe, secure within its Unionised borders, was unable to understand what happened at the start of that year in Kiev. It was Ukrainians who were shooting other Ukrainians, on orders given by Ukrainian authorities.
In the case of other European states, the transformation of political systems often brought on such tidal waves of change. Centres for memory were constructed e. Today, Ukraine has the opportunity to change its political system from a corrupt oligarchy to a decently organised liberal democracy. The question of whether the Ukrainian nation itself will, simultaneously, be able to come to some sort of peace accord with itself, might be just as important to its future as economic reforms or its presidential elections.
One the one hand, the recent example of Rwanda , along with a tremendous political tradition of so-called transformative justice and declarations of forgiveness in politics, could provide Ukraine with a number of useful templates. In addition, the challenge facing Ukrainian reconciliation is the only potential solution thanks to which the average European can, in an engaged fashion, think of the now distant in time as well as space Rwandan genocide — and other such tragedies.
On the other hand, the European era of reconciliation, if not the concept of reconciliation as a whole, now belongs to the past. These payments will also be available to families of agents of the state who died in the line of their duties.
Is this a new episode in the age of reconciliation? Is a one-off payment enough to unite a divided society? Though the decision made by the Ukrainian government seems interesting, I would be wary of coming to such conclusions. For now, we are left with more questions than answers. And what if this is unlikely to change for a decade or two?
Im Mittelpunkt der deutschen Medienaufmerksamkeit stand heute ein Interview mit dem ehemaligen Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt. Russland nimmt den Dialog nicht auf, weil es gar nicht reden will. Russland erwartet vom Westen, dass dieser sein Vorgehen akzeptiert. Die russische Entschlossenheit hat in dieser Sache keine Zweifel gelassen.
Die diskrete Warnung vor weiteren Sanktionen kann man ebenso gut als stillschweigende Akzeptanz des Status quo verstehen. Darauf werden sich die Britten nie einlassen. Aber dabei sollte man kein Risiko eingehen. Der Europarat? Die Bedeutung dieser Institution wird nach und nach geringer. Das stimmt. Das ist nicht das erste Mal. Die unbeholfenen Versuche, in der gesamten EU Entschlossenheit aufzubauen, bringen hier nichts.
Sanctions, however, tend to sound better in theory than they work in reality. This proposition is underlined with good intentions and often comes from people who wish the Ukrainians well. It is, however, a largely subconscious symptom of three intellectual sins. These are: a peculiar amnesia, a postcolonial approach to the place of our Eastern neighbor in the geopolitical order and ignorance about the local realities. We like to stress how important is the unique Central European experience for Polish political thinking.
The two totalitarianism regimes which left their gruesome traces here have supposedly made us both more aware of ideological blindness and sensitive to human rights breaches in the case of those who struggle for freedom. Their representatives like to emphasize that. Moving on to postcolonial thinking according to which Ukraine is our younger sibling , perhaps the country does have, on the societal level, some democratic ambitions. But when push comes to shove, it does not really know what democracy is about.
It is a corrupt and half-baked country where the chances for maintaining the rule of law and enhancing civility are bleak even in the long run. Along the same lines, if the Ukrainians will not prove mature enough to settle their issues with Yanukovych on their own, it is surely not up to us to help them democratize their own country. Furthermore, the argument is raised that the Ukrainian economy will not survive if it becomes detached from the Russian Federation. We fail to recognize that this is the same type of rhetoric that hurt us so much in relation to our own country before the breakthrough and shortly after it.
The Poles have become so well-off, and got their brains so deeply fixated on EU financial support, that they have completely forgotten where they themselves were 25 years ago. And yet it seems so easy to keep convincing everyone in Brussels that Poland will teach its European partners to think in terms of solidarity.
And then there is the third aspect — vast ignorance regarding Ukraine. Shots were fired and victims fell not years ago, not even months ago — this is happening now. But this discloses another dimension of ignorance. The growing radicalization of parts of the Ukrainian society — often mainly misinterpreted as the radicalization of political groups — so far has not lead to similar outcomes in Ukraine.
What should the Polish politicians do in such circumstances? As thirty-year-olds, who lived over two thirds of our lives in a free Poland, we would like to believe that the assurances of values, which according to the older generation were the foundations of a new Poland, were not just empty lip-service. We want to keep thinking that those values are not more important to us than to those who introduced them. We are not naive. We understand that politics and diplomacy are often the craft of slow and patient actions. So that Poland faces the challenge of changing the politics of Brussels and other European capitals towards Ukraine and our other neighbors, such as Belarus.
The weakness of the EU in the East is rooted in the overwhelming formalization of the way Brussels functions, where democracy is defeated daily by bureaucracy and technocracy, as well as a faulty system of incentives for the Eastern countries to undertake democratic reforms. Most importantly, there is a visible lack of a country, which would take onto itself the responsibility for a permanent advocacy in the name of the Eastern nations. There is no reason why the program pompously dubbed the Eastern Partnership should not become a truly European project.
There is no reason why Poland should not play for Ukraine a similar role that Germany played for us, when it came to accepting Warsaw into the circle of EU capitals. This is not — to make it clear — another example of postcolonial thinking, but a stubborn pursuance of partnership.
We cannot, however, project historical schemes onto the present. There will not be another , nor another Let us cease treating the Ukrainians as silly schoolchildren whom we, the self-proclaimed professors of democracy, will tell lengthy stories of how we used to do things, while our own backyard is far from ideal even today. We should also not forget that the European Union that we used to dream of is today neck-deep in crises — an economic crisis and also a crisis of its values. Because, in spite of all the problems, it can still offer quite a lot. In the grayness of our democracy we cannot allow anyone to convince us — as some Western intellectual circles once did — that there is no fundamental qualitative difference between democracy and authoritarianism.
To paraphrase the words that the then dissident, now journalist, Konstanty Gebert, once directed to Western activists: our point of departure is for many Ukrainians the point of arrival that they dream of. It is easy not to value freedom and to forget about it, but ask in Belarus, in Russia and now also in Ukraine — how difficult it is to live without it? Putin ist sich dessen bestens bewusst. Olympia dient dazu, die nationale Euphorie zu befeuern.
Aber im Grunde ist Sotschi nichts weiter als ein Potemkinsches Dorf, das vorgibt das achte Weltwunder zu sein. Sotschi existiert nicht. Ihre Freilassung war eine reine PR-Aktion. Das hat Putin mit Stalin, Chruschtschow und Breschnew gemein. Die Mittel aber, die Putin einsetzt, sind keineswegs innovativ. In gewissem Sinne ja. Oder zumindest fast. Es zeigt sehr viel Wunschdenken. Und gleichzeitig ist man stolz auf das untergegangene Sowjetimperium. Putins Russland muss eher an der Sowjetunion unter Stalin und Breschnew gemessen werden als an einem idealen demokratischen Rechtsstaat.
Sie hat gesagt, Putin wolle damit seine Allmacht unter Beweis stellen. Gibt es ein solches Bild von Russland auch in Deutschland? Ich stimme ihr da zu, gleichzeitig ist Sotschi aber auch ein Beweis der Ohnmacht. Putin hat die beiden jungen Frauen vor Weihnachten begnadigt. Er kann sich nicht alles erlauben. Das zeigt auch die Grenzen von Putins Macht. Es ist nicht die Sowjetunion unter Stalin oder Breschnew. Ich glaube, das ist ein zutreffendes Bild. Aber er ist leicht reizbar und hat ein enormes Potential. Russland ist ein Land mit einer wunderbaren Kultur. Die Regierung kann sich selbst Geld beschaffen, sie braucht das Volk nicht dazu.
Das ist kein Zufall. Es ist ein wohlmeinender Vorschlag. Ihre Vertreter heben das gerne hervor. Was sollte die polnische Politik in dieser Situation tun? Wir sind nicht naiv. Wir wissen, dass Politik und Diplomatie auch die Kunst des bedachten und geduldigen Handelns sind. Und dabei geht es nicht um postkoloniales Denken, sondern um ein beharrliches Streben nach Partnerschaft. Es wird weder ein zweites noch ein zweites geben. Wir sollten auch nicht vergessen, dass unsere uns um die Jahrhundertwende ideal erscheinende EU heute in einer Wirtschafts- und Wertekrise steckt. Denn trotz aller Probleme ist das immer noch einiges.
Many people believe the events which took place in Poland 25 years ago should today be reviewed with sobriety, leaving aside all unnecessary emotions or nostalgic tendencies. The problem with this apprach is that the heated arguments over the Transformation which took place in are an inevitable consequence of its political success. Americans have their The French their perennial And Poland? Here, things are trickier. None of the above dates can be considered a singular, defining turning point. They do however represent events which are more and less singular in context.
When thinking about a founding moment, which could be seen as setting Poland on a social, civic platform, then it could be , with its Solidarity symbolism, its collective action and hope. However, if we are to select a moment which represents the Polish political scene — the one which is still with us today — then without a doubt the reference point remains the Round Table talks.
Even now, they are the cause of such extreme agitation, both on the Left as well as the Right sides of the political divide, precisely because they tuned out to be a political success. Meanwhile, it was also a moment when the various powers which were fighting over Poland achieved a form of compromise, rather than absolute justice or perfect freedom. It was a moment which gave birth to all the divisions which to this very day exist in the Polish political landscape, so very deeply rooted in the events of a quarter of a century ago.
This was also a time of immense complication and lack of clarity, of uncertainty regarding all moral judgements — and hence a moment of real politics. In reality, the Round Table talks were none of these. It was neither treason nor conspiracy — the compromise achieved then was temporary, and the reality which followed more fluid than usual, and, as we have since learnt from testimonies given by historians, one which surprised even those involved directly.
Even though in politics declarations of unity do in unique cases happen, politics as such does not depend on unity. Let us add that this change was peaceful, which, in contrast with places such as Romania, was not all that obvious at the time. Peaceful — this is important also in the sense that it might be better at the outset of a new system to have the tricky concept of the Round Table talks, rather than the Battle of Warsaw, which reinforced the authority of a man who then went on to dismantle Polish democracy in , on his way to staging a coup.
They were a time of the founding of modern Polish politics, which apart from the round table model, had at its disposal and has still a whole range of other modes of working: civic protests and its institutionalisation, parliamentary democracy, party politics and non-governmental organisations. In a letter he wrote to a friend from Warsaw in , Ralf Dahrendorf drew his attention to the fact that the Round Table should in no way be seen as an example of normal politics. All this is a game of democracy.
These are fantasies dreamt up by desk-bound intellectuals, their heads buried in books, luckily without any conception of what real politics and real violence is about. Or else they are the cynical promises made by politicians. In this game, it is worth thinking about what sort of aspects determine the contemporary state of Poland.
Simplifying somewhat, it can be defined as: just after the Transformation — the building of a capitalist economy, at what seemed like any price, and this down to the horrific state of national finances at that time; before , and then prior to — including Poland in the West, through membership of NATO and EU; after — trying to match standards of living in the West through the effective distribution of EU funds. Today, from the perspective of the last 25 years, we need to evaluate and define our aims, which will combine to define the Polish political drive in the next decade.
What will this affect? First of all: the character of the Polish state. Or maybe it is simply a state without any ideas, which desperately needs character and strategy? What should Polish education look like — not only in terms of middle and higher education, but also early years, pre-school and high school? How to manage the ageing population, since we know that even the most generous welfare organisations in Austria or Germany are failing to increase childbirth rates?
Secondly, foreign policies. How should it position itself in the 21 st century in relation to its partners in Europe, as well as to USA, Russia and other countries? What is the actual condition — in terms of international relations — of Poland as a lawful state? How is this affected by the massive scandal caused by the building of a secret CIA prison within Polish borders and the way in which we deal with this scandal today? And finally, what sorts of conclusions do we, Poles, draw from the Edward Snowden affair?
Thirdly, civil society. How to fund civil society? How to convince Polish politicians and businesspeople that they are responsible for it too? This are but a few political trajectories which must be taken into consideration when trying to define the state of the Polish political environment in the next few years. It is worth giving it some thought, remembering at the same time that, a quarter of a century ago, we all won. It is up to us, and the hard work we put in, what that win will amount to. Da scheint viel Wahres dran zu sein, denn nur wenige Themen haben in den vergangenen Wochen derartige Aufregung bei den internationalen Kommentatoren erzeugt, wie das Ergebnis der am kommenden Sonntag bevorstehenden Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Karolina Wigura: Popularity of the extreme right in Europe in the past few years has often been explained by the influence of the financial crisis from As an economist, do you think this is also the case with Hungary? It recombines traditional motives of national socialism such as protectionism, egalitarianism, romantic anti-capitalism, state interventionism and the like, and complements these with hate speech with regard to communists, the EU, Jewish capital, the transnational companies, etc.
As to the future of Hungarian politics, I was prepared for a kind of soft nationalism with suppressed passions, coded racist discourse, and a few ridiculous neo-nazi groups. In other words, I was prepared, naively enough, for laughter rather than angst and contempt.
At any rate, there are hardly any societies in Eastern Europe suffering from the crisis to a similar extent which have to face as well-established nazis as we do. How is it possible that a party whose program is so completely uninteresting, is so catchy for voters? This seems to be true at least in Poland. But returning to the Hungarian extreme right — is there nothing particularly typical for it? However, I would rather say something more about a peculiar symbiosis of the right and the extreme right in Hungary — a frivolous cohabitation that probably makes the whole issue much less boring, especially for the Polish audience.
Nevertheless, I would like to shed some light on a potential asymmetry. The boundaries between them are fuzzy. If more and more voters seem convinced by the extreme right organizations, this might have fatal consequences for Polish democracy. For the time being, Orban is not a neo-nazi but he can turn his coat rather quickly: you may remember that he was not yet a national-conservative autocrat in the early s , and one hopes he will not become one soon.
However, he did his best to shatter essential pillars of the rule of law, bringing parliamentary democracy to the verge of dictatorship. You have mentioned that Hungarian society undergoes a fundamental social change. What do you mean by this? I do not only mean his new constitution that did away with many of the former checks and balances, the new electoral law that abolished the level playing field for the parties, or the new media law that ensures citizens remain ignorant about the dismantling of liberal democracy.
These are all well-known facts, I believe, for the interested public outside Hungary. Cutting the budgets of cultural institutions, a decision that annoys us, intellectuals so much, is just the whipped cream on the top of the cake, as we say in Hungarian. Orban might still lose the next parliamentary elections to a rational center-oriented opposition, though…. Yes, his own oligarchs and political appointees such as the president, the chief justice and prosecutor, the head of the Constitutional Court, the governor of the National Bank, etc.
But will we arrive in a post-Orban world soon? Would you point to fascist sympathies from the past, that have not been worked through enough or to love of authoritarian regime? Or maybe Hungarians have never had the opportunity to learn to believe in democracy? The moderately anti-liberal, euroskeptic and racist attitudes of Hungarians who had been relatively tolerant of corruption, rule-bending and the like were offered a new Social Contract combining — to put it simply — Janos Kadar with Miklos Horthy.
According to it, in a disintegrating Europe and in the global mood of challenging liberal values, the nation needs a strong paternalist leader providing citizens with supreme goods such as security, order, decent living standards and national pride in exchange of not disturbing him in looking after his people. I am talking here about hundreds of thousands of people who, as reliable members of the new clientele, benefit from the ongoing change of the guard, I would rather call it cleansing, launched by the government in schools, hospitals, courts, city halls, state-owned companies, theatres, the army and the police and whatnot.
Orban is a master of coded racist and overt irredentist rhetoric as well as of law-and-order discourse and a kitschy historical interpretation of Hungarian Christianity. Then, frustration might turn into violence, resentment and hatred against Orban who used these passions against socialists and liberals for a whole decade at least. Of course, I would be most happy to see the failure of creeping nazification. But witnessing the socialist moreover, pre-Blairist-style socialist leanings of the majority of democratic opposition in my country, my happiness would not be unreserved.
Aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftsstruktur ist Deutschland in einer ganz anderen Situation. Die Wohlfahrtstaaten sind heute in hohem Masse verschuldet. Das ist eher ein Kampf der Rentiers gegen die Rentner. Verstehen Sie, die Rentiers sind die, die Zinsen bekommen und die Rentner sind die, die Renten bekommen… Wer hat als erster Anspruch auf die Konkursmasse des Wohlfahrtstaats? Ich bin nicht sicher, ob man das so sagen kann. Was dem ersten Teil betrifft, da bin ich ganz Ihrer Meinung.
Nach dem Krieg ging es darum, den westlichen Teil Deutschlands so anzubinden, dass von Deutschland keine Gefahr mehr ausgehen konnte. Eine notwendige Korrektur der Marktwirtschaft auf nationaler Ebene in Gestalt desWohlfahrtstaats hat stattgefunden. Diese Korrekturen fanden auf nationaler Ebene statt. Denken Sie, dass hier der Fehler gemacht wurde?
Ich muss sagen, ihre Diagnose ist aus der polnischen Perspektive nur schwer zu akzeptieren, da in Polen die marktwirtschaftliche Reformen schnell den demokratischen Durchbruch zur Folge hatten…. In Wirklichkeit haben bis nur wenige Leute geglaubt, dass eine Gesellschaft sowohl kapitalistisch als auch demokratisch sein kann. Es gab immer Angst vor dem Konflikt zwischen den alten feudalen Eliten und der Arbeiterbewegung.
Das genau gab es in Deutschland zwischen den Kriegen. Das hatte aber eine ganze Reihe von Voraussetzungen. B, dass die Demokratie den Markt korrigieren konnte. Das bedeutete weniger Ungleichheit, mehr soziale Sicherheit, progressive Besteuerung, kostenlose Gesundheitssysteme usw. Denken sie nicht, dass hier nur die Krise wirkt. Diese Abbauprozesse, die hier stattfinden sind von Dauer.
Und die Menschen sind in diesem Alltag gefangen. Sie werden auch dadurch unter Druck gesetzt, dass die Regierungen sagen, das machen wir nicht, und das auch nicht, damit die Zinsen auf unsere Schulden nicht wachsen. Die Finanzsysteme sind mittlerweile so komplex und abstrakt und undurchschaubar geworden, dass wenn man jetzt von den Leuten verlangt, dass jemand mit einer Alternative kommt, sie ganz erschrocken sind. Und wenn wir jetzt Mittel- und Osteuropa anschauen?
Dann kam aber Aber es wird schwierig. Einer der einflussreichsten Denker Europas. Doktor der Soziologie, Journalistin. Vergebung als politische Strategie]. Angeblich soll Ludwig XIV. Sogar in der derzeitigen Krise. Nach gab es kein Europa. Darunter waren heute vollkommen in Vergessenheit geratene Imperialismen, wie der belgische.
Im Europa ist das Ergebnis einer Explosion, es ist ein Club der besiegten Imperien. Ich nenne das den Mythos der zweiten Chance. Europa sollte ein Kontinent der Regeneration sein. Wir haben nicht einmal bemerkt, wie sich die Transformation von Schuld in Schulden vollzogen hat.
Die Nation , das ist zu viel. Erst die kulturelle Evolution hat uns urbanisiert, nationalisiert, zu Millionen zusammengeschlossen. Nationen sind Fieber-Kollektive. Bereits vom Morgen an haben sie eine Temperatur von gut 37 Grad. Und dann stellt sich vielleicht heraus, dass es auf der Welt nicht nur hundert Menschen gibt, sondern viertausend, vielleicht sogar etwas mehr.
Aber vielleicht zeigt sich das mit der Zeit. Nicht nur der Osten und der Westen unterscheiden sich stark voneinander. Und es gibt keinen Lehrer. Jahrhunderts aussah? Sie personifizierten den Staat. Und genau diese Situation haben wir heute in Europa. Frankreich, der wohl etatistischste Staat dieser Welt. Die Polen mit ihrem Staat, den es nicht gab. Die Spanier, die Portugiesen, wo der Staat immer noch etwas anderes ist. Die Schweiz, in der der Staat als direkte Emanation der Gesellschaft verstanden wird. Das wird noch sehr viel Zeit brauchen.
KW: Vielleicht sollten wir mit der Reflexion in kleinerem Umfang beginnen? Und jeder unsere eigene Paranoia hegen. Das erschwert die Kommunikation sehr. Die Polen haben eine sehr starke antisowjetische, oder antirussische, Paranoia. PS: Wir haben andere paranoische Komponenten. Darin sind die Deutschen zum Beispiel Meister. Ich kann daher nun endlich auf die Frage antworten, die Sie mir ganz am Anfang gestellt haben. Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren,. Die erste war die internationale Rezession, mit der wir uns seit herumschlagen.
Die Geschichte des Es ist so weit gekommen, dass sie ein Versprechen bleiben darf. Ganze Jahrzehnte lang war die Demokratie keine Legitimation Europas, es sei denn es ging um die Demokratie von Nationalstaaten. Die neuen Legitimationen sollten sich vor allem durch drei Elemente auszeichnen. Drittens ist der demokratische Bestandteil enorm wichtig. Es gibt auch rein soziologische Tools, wie deliberative Umfragen oder andere Elemente der deliberativen Demokratie. Professor at the University of Oxford. Karolina Wigura: Liberal rhetoric is in retreat everywhere.
Timothy Garton Ash: The first reason for that is that the in- ternational political climate has changed. Francis Fukuyama prophesied the end of history only two decades ago, claiming that there is no ideological alternative for liberal democracy, an alternative that would have a transnational importance that would pull people from other countries. This is an attractive model, not only for the rulers of China, but also for governments in developing countries, for instance in Africa— especially since the economic crisis started in We are living in a more and more post-Western world.
The whole global liberal order, which we built after , with the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights is in danger. We are in defensive mode right now. Western multiculturalism. I find the term itself very harmful. However, if we talk about social reality — multiculturalism exists. Therefore, a liberal state has a duty to provide freedom of speech and equality to every single person, regardless of his or her culture or religion.
We have conflicts in social practice, though. Switzerland has recently held a referendum as to whe- ther minarets should be built next to mosques. All the discussions about hijabs, cartoons, theatre plays which are charged with being a terrorist threat — these are all sources of very strong negative emotions. From both points of view, a Western, and a global one, we lack a peaceful discussion about the priorities of a liberal society, what should be protected at any price, and where we might have some space for compromise and negotiation.
Completely wrong. At home, in the Western world, we are not weak. We build our own rules here. But we also do that realisti- cally: there is no place for faith in universal liberalism, in the same fashion as we were thinking about international order after We are looking at the classic liberalism of John Stuart Mill, Gladstone, Orwell, and for a way to adapt it to our times. I was discussing such an understanding of liberalism, both classic and modern at the same time, with Ralf Dahrendorf, who was my long-time friend until his death in That means not only political liberalism, not only economic, but also social, following the conviction that the very poor, people without education, or the sick without health care, do not have conditions to fully use their freedom.
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